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Venezuelan Presidential Recall
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Abstract. A referendum to recall President Hugo Cha´vez was held in
Venezuela in August of 2004. In the referendum, voters were to vote
YES if they wished to recall the President and NO if they wanted
him to continue in office. The official results were 59% NO and 41%
YES. Even though the election was monitored by various international
groups including the Organization of American States and the Carter
Center (both of which declared that the referendum had been con-
ducted in a free and transparent manner), the outcome of the election
was questioned by other groups both inside and outside of Venezuela.
The collection of manuscripts that comprise this issue of Statistical
Science discusses the general topic of election forensics but also focuses
on different statistical approaches to explore, post-election, whether ir-
regularities in the voting, vote transmission or vote counting processes
could be detected in the 2004 presidential recall referendum. In this
introduction to the Venezuela issue, we discuss the more recent liter-
ature on post-election auditing, describe the institutional context for
the 2004 Venezuelan referendum, and briefly introduce each of the five
contributions.
Key words and phrases: Election forensics, post-election audits, Vene-
zuelan Presidential Recall Referendum, exit polls, electronic voting sys-
tems, election accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
In every democracy, citizens have the opportunity
to participate in elections at different levels. It is
critically important that elections be free and fair,
by which we mean that institutions and safeguards
to guarantee full access of eligible voters and of can-
didates must be in place. In most advanced democ-
racies we can reasonably assume that this will be
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the case (except in localized instances of malfea-
sance or non-intentional error) but with the advent
of many new democracies around the world, oppor-
tunities for irregularities of all kinds have multiplied
(Mebane, 2007).
Since approximately the 1960s (Hyde, 2011), the
practice of inviting international observers to mon-
itor the electoral process as it takes place has be-
come almost standard practice. International orga-
nizations such as the United Nations or the Organi-
zation of American States, alongside non-governmen-
tal groups such as the Carter Center, have often
been asked to produce a “seal of approval” for elec-
tions that were expected to be contested. The 2004
Venezuelan Referendum to Recall the President was
one such election as we discuss below. While ensur-
ing that elections are free and fair has been the main
focus of these organizations in recent years, less has
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been done about the question of whether the election
outcome reflects the intentions of the electorate.
Election monitoring, typically conducted by ob-
servation of the electoral process as it occurs in the
field, is aimed at detecting irregularities such as voter
access and the integrity of ballot boxes, but does not
address the issue of election accuracy. We say that
an election is accurate when the outcome of the elec-
tion is consistent with the preferences of voters. By
accurate we do not mean perfect; in every election,
there will be some differences between the official
vote count and the actual votes that were cast by
the electorate. These differences are often inconse-
quential, in that they do not affect the outcome of
the election. When the differences are large enough
to determine an outcome that is not reflective of
voters’ intentions, then the election is said to be in-
accurate (Mebane, 2007).
The consequences of conducting elections that are
provably flawed, either by mistake or by malfea-
sance, can be costly from a political, social and even
economic point of view. A winner who is perceived
to be “illegitimate” might not be able to gain the
respect of disgruntled voters and in extreme cases,
might be unable to lead (as was the case with the
presidential elections of 2001 in Bangladesh, Euro-
pean Union, 2001). Further, after an election has
been conducted, it is a challenge to decide what to
do even when significant irregularities have been de-
tected. An example close to home was the voting in
Jasper County, South Carolina, during the presiden-
tial election of 2000. While it was clear that tam-
pering with voting machines had occurred, the le-
gal battles that ensued post-election did not lead
to widely accepted rulings (Jacobson and Rosen-
feld, 2002). (The discussions came to an end once
it was argued that even if the fraudulent voting in
Jasper County had not occurred, South Carolina
would have been a Bush state anyway.) In practi-
cal terms, any remedial measure implemented after
an election has been declared inaccurate has its own
limitations and thus, fixing an election problem after
the fact is typically very difficult.
The introduction of voting machines of different
kinds has created some uncertainty in the outcome
of elections, even in well-established democracies such
as the United States (Lehoucq, 2003). Voting ma-
chines do not always produce printed reports, and
when they do, the reports are unsuitable for detect-
ing voting irregularities (Dopp, 2009). Data reports
are rarely produced in formats that enable statisti-
cal analyses and often, the data are stored in propri-
etary file formats that limit their usefulness. Serious
errors in vote counting have been documented; an
example of a software failure that resulted in inex-
plicably lost votes occurred during the 2008 pres-
idential election in several counties in California,
where optical-count scanners manufactured by Pre-
mier Election Solutions (formerly Diebold Election
Solutions) not only did not count votes but also
deleted any signs that the votes had been cast at all
(Zetter, 2008). Voter-verifiable paper ballot records
used by some electronic voting machines are not
error- and tamper-proof either (Balzarotti et al.,
2008) because machines can be programmed to pro-
duce apparently matching counts and paper reports
that can be difficult to identify as fraudulent.
Over the last decade or two, there has been re-
newed interest in the development of statistical me-
thodology that can be used in the course of elec-
tion audits (both pre- and post-election) to detect
irregularities and guarantee the integrity of the elec-
tions. The ultimate goal of election auditing is to
determine whether the winner of the election has
been called correctly. In the United States, concerns
about the legitimacy of elections reached a new height
after the 2000 presidential election, where a combi-
nation of flawed administrative practices, voter sup-
pression and other irregularities threw into question
the outcome in Florida. The idea that the results
of an election should be confirmed via some kind of
post-election manual tallying is becoming more ac-
cepted and has been institutionalized in many states
in the U.S. In California, for example, the law now
requires that ballots cast in no fewer than one per-
cent of the precincts in any election be manually re-
counted (Saltman, 2006; Stark, 2008). Many other
state legislatures are considering bills that will also
require a post-election audit of anywhere between
1% and 10% of the precincts, selected randomly in
different ways. While these are positive steps toward
creating a system for carrying out post-election au-
dits in an “objective” way, no system that estab-
lishes a fixed proportion of precincts to be audited
can guarantee that a full manual recount would con-
firm the outcome, with a sufficiently high proba-
bility. Stark (2008, 2010) proposes an approach to
sample precincts that depends on the apparent mar-
gin of victory, the number of precincts in the elec-
tion, the number of ballots cast in each precinct and
the target level of confidence that the real winner
is called. McCarthy et al. (2008) propose a simi-
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lar approach to selecting precincts for post-election
manual ballot re-count that depends on the power
with which we wish to identify the true election win-
ner. The collection of technologies and methods that
can be used to assess the legitimacy of elections is
known as election forensics (Mebane, 2007). In addi-
tion to the more statistical aspects of election foren-
sics, other published research has focused on the me-
chanics of post-election auditing (Estok, Nevitte and
Cowan, 2002; Norden et al., 2007).
The manuscripts that are included in this issue of
Statistical Science propose different but complemen-
tary methods to collect, analyze and interpret post-
election data, and provide an overview of the type
of statistical tools that can be useful in evaluating
the integrity of an election. The motivation for all
of the manuscripts included in this set was the 2004
referendum carried out in Venezuela, where voters
were asked to vote YES or NO to the question of
whether President Hugo Cha´vez should be recalled.
Questions about the election’s accuracy were raised
almost immediately and several groups in Venezuela
and abroad set out to analyze some of the data that
became available after the official results were an-
nounced. While the manuscripts included in this is-
sue suggest that various forms of apparently inten-
tional tampering seem to have occurred, other con-
tributions to the literature (Taylor, 2005; Weisbrot,
Rosnick and Tucker, 2004) argue that the evidence
is insufficient to conclude that the outcome of the
referendum was not correct.
The remainder of this introduction is organized as
follows. First, we briefly describe the 2004 presiden-
tial referendum in Venezuela. We then discuss each
of the five manuscripts that comprise the Venezuela
referendum set. We finish with a brief conclusions
section.
2. THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL RECALL
REFERENDUM IN VENEZUELA
In 1998, President Hugo Cha´vez was elected Presi-
dent of Venezuela with almost 58% of the vote. As is
required in Venezuela, the election was organized by
the CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral), a body com-
posed of five individuals who must be confirmed by
the legislative branch of the Venezuelan government
and that has the mission of ensuring that elections
are transparent and conducted according to the elec-
toral normatives. In 1999, a new national Consti-
tution was enacted. The new Constitution allowed
for the conduct of presidential recall referenda and
established the protocol under which this type of
referendum could be conducted. In 2000, President
Cha´vez agreed to run for early re-election and was
re-elected to a new six-year term with almost 60%
of the vote. While the integrity of the 2000 elec-
tion already raised some questions, no formal chal-
lenge was submitted. However, the political situa-
tion in Venezuela continued to deteriorate and led to
a national strike that was resolved only when a new
CNE was established in 2003 (with mediation by the
Carter Center) and agreed to organize a presidential
recall referendum to be conducted in 2004.
The presidential recall referendum (RR) was con-
ducted in August of 2004. This election was the first
in which touch-screen voting machines were ever
used in a national election in Venezuela. A large
proportion (about 87%) of all votes were cast in vot-
ing centers that used touch-screen voting machines.
The machines produced a vote confirmation paper
receipt for each voter, that were deposited in sealed
ballot boxes. Most of those paper voting records
were not analyzed. The machines were connected
to the totalizing servers of the CNE via telephone
lines and transmitted the voting totals in each spe-
cific machine to the servers. Two post-election au-
dits of a subset of the voting centers were conducted
in cooperation with the Carter Center and with the
Organization of American States.
In the RR, participants could choose to vote SI
(to recall the president) or NO (to allow him to re-
main in his post). The official count was 59% for NO
and 41% for SI. The Carter Center declared that the
elections had been fair and transparent and their re-
port pointed to no major irregularities (Carter Cen-
ter, 2005a, 2005b). Other non-governmental orga-
nizations, however, carried out analyses of different
sets of data arising from the election and the two
post-election audits and raised questions about the
integrity of the RR.
3. ANALYSES OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL
RECALL REFERENDUM
Here we briefly introduce the manuscripts that
were accepted for inclusion in the Venezuela issue.
Four of the manuscripts, those by Hausmann and
Rigobon, Prado and Sanso´, Pericchi and Torres, and
Mart´ın suggest that there is sufficient evidence to
conclude that the referendum was fraudulent. In
contrast, the contribution by Jime´nez, while still
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declaring the RR outcome to be illegitimate, ar-
gues that the available information is not conclusive
enough to declare that the official results are incor-
rect in the sense of Hausmann and Rigobo´n, Prado
and Sanso´, or Pericchi and Torres.
3.1 Delfino and Salas
Delfino and Salas compare the proportion of YES
votes in each voting center with the proportion of
voters registered in that center who had signed the
petition to request the referendum. The assumption
underlying their analysis is that most of the peo-
ple who signed the petition for the referendum are
likely to vote YES. This is a plausible assumption
given that no signature collection centers were al-
lowed outside of Venezuela (yet voting centers were
established in embassies and consulates around the
world) and that individuals participating in the sig-
nature drive were easily identifiable by the govern-
ment (but votes cast during the referendum were
secret).
Delfino and Salas find discrepancies between what
one might expect given the distribution of signing
registered voters across centers and the official pro-
portion of YES votes in each of the centers. These
discrepancies appear to be larger in voting centers
with touch-screen voting machines than in non-com-
puterized centers. In the more populous centers
(where the number of registered voters is largest) the
relationship between the proportion of YES votes
appears to be too tightly associated with the pro-
portion of registered voters who signed the petition
for the referendum.
Finally, the authors also compare the correlation
between the proportion of YES votes and the pro-
portion of signatures in each voting center, in two
groups of centers defined by the proportion of sig-
natures, in different elections that were held in the
same voting centers between 1998 and 2004 and find
inexplicable results. In all other elections, the cor-
relations are low in centers with small percentages
of registered voters who signed the petition, and
higher in centers with large proportions of signa-
tures. In contrast, the correlations were very high in
both groups of voting centers during the RR, a re-
sult that cannot be easily explained.
3.2 Pericchi and Torres
Pericchi and Torres propose an approach to evalu-
ate the integrity of elections that relies on the New-
comb–Benford Law for first and second digits and
on a generalization of the law for cases where the
total number of observations is capped. The main
goal of the Pericchi and Torres work is to develop
a new statistical tool that can be used in a wide vari-
ety of applications to determine whether numerical
outcomes show irregularities.
The Newcomb–Benford Law establishes that the
distribution of digits (first, second, etc.) is not uni-
form. In principle, therefore, one can compare the
distribution of first significant digits, second signifi-
cant digits and so on to the distribution that would
be expected under the Newcomb–Benford Law, and
use the discrepancy as a test statistic for the hy-
pothesis that the observed distribution of digits is
not due to tampering. The Newcomb–Benford Law
holds only asymptotically when the digits arise from
aggregated unit-less counts in small samples. Be-
cause the distribution of the first significant digit
depends on the size of the sample, Pericchi and Tor-
res suggest that the second Benford Law (or the law
that refers to the distribution of the second signifi-
cant digit) has better statistical properties in small
samples.
The authors use several elections around the world
to illustrate the approach they propose for detect-
ing departures from what would be expected under
no irregularities. They find that in all cases, the null
hypothesis that the frequency distribution of second
significant digits behaves according to Newcomb–
Benford is not rejected. The only exception is the
2004 Venezuelan presidential recall referendum, whe-
re the Bayes factor for assessing the posterior proba-
bilities of the null model and the observed frequency
distribution for the second significant digit suggest
that the Newcomb–Benford model is not consistent
with the observed frequencies.
A valuable contribution in this manuscript is the
extension of the law to cases where the total num-
ber of counts is bounded. Under a restriction on
the maximum number of counts, different voting
precincts (or other units) tend to have a constant
number of voters. Pericchi and Torres show that the
frequency distribution of the second significant digit
is less sensitive to departures from the expected be-
havior under the law even when the total number of
units in each center is about the same.
3.3 Prado and Sanso´
Prado and Sanso´ use exit poll data from two inde-
pendent surveys conducted during the RR by a non-
governmental organization called Su´mate and by
Primero Justicia, a political party in the opposi-
tion. Both groups collected voting information na-
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tionwide, by interviewing voters as they exited the
voting centers. To guarantee confidentiality, respon-
dents were asked to put their vote in a sealed enve-
lope and in a box similar to ballot boxes. No other
information—gender, age, socio-economic status or
any other—was collected from the participants.
The forecasts that were obtained from both exit
polls were in remarkable agreement. Both predicted
that the YES vote would win, with about 60% of the
total votes cast. The sharp discrepancy with the of-
ficial CNE results, which reported that the NO vote
was about 59%, was the motivation for the Prado
and Sanso´ contribution.
Prado and Sanso´ carry out a simple analysis, that
consists in exploring whether the exit poll results
are likely if we were to assume that the official CNE
election results are true. In other words, if in fact
the NO received almost 60% of the vote, what is the
probability that we would observe the exit poll re-
sults that were observed in each voting center? The
calculation is tantamount to computing a p-value
for the hypothesis that the CNE results are correct,
when using the exit poll results as the test statistic.
They find that for a large proportion of the vot-
ing centers, these p-values are small, typically below
0.02, providing some evidence against the assump-
tion that the CNE results are reliable. They note
that this result is observed in centers all over the
country, whether large or small and for both com-
puterized and manual voting systems.
The disagreement between the official results and
what the exit polls predicted can be attributable to
factors other than tampering by the CNE. Prado
and Sanso´ offer several alternative explanations for
the differences, but provide arguments that cast
doubt on most of them. Still, this type of analy-
sis, while suggestive, in no way can lead to a con-
clusion of tampering by the government, something
with which the authors readily agree. While incon-
clusive, the comparison of official results and believ-
able forecasts is a useful tool to at least call atten-
tion to electoral events where irregularities may be
present.
Some potentially significant drawbacks in the Pra-
do and Sanso´ analyses are listed here. First, they
have no information at all about the proportion of
voters who refused to respond to the exit poll survey.
Second, they do not know anything about the non-
respondents. If we are to reasonably assume that the
probability of being a respondent in the exit poll
is associated with voting patterns, then the conclu-
sions from their study can be dramatically altered if
the proportion of nonignorable nonrespondents hap-
pens to be large. Jime´nez (see below) also mentions
the fact that Prado and Sanso´ appear to ignore the
fact that the sample of voters to be interviewed by
exit pollsters was not a simple random sample but
rather was stratified by gender, age category, time
of day and other variables. As long as respondents
were selected randomly within stratum and as long
as the number of individuals in each stratum is pro-
portional to the number of persons in the population
in the same stratum, the Prado and Sanso´ analysis
is adequate.
3.4 Mart´ın
Mart´ın’s analyses are novel in that she uses what
might be termed metadata. Metadata means differ-
ent things in different contexts; in the survey con-
text, metadata include, for example, the time it takes
each respondent to complete the survey, the number
of attempts made to contact the participant, etc.
(Groves et al., 2009). In summary, metadata arise
from the process of conducting the election rather
than from the election itself. Mart´ın uses informa-
tion on the number of bytes of incoming and ongoing
data to CNE servers, start and close time of connec-
tions between voting centers and CNE servers, and
number of data packets in the incoming and outgo-
ing transmissions.
Mart´ın finds unexplainable differences in the vol-
ume of information transmitted (both outgoing and
incoming) by what she calls High Traffic Centers and
Cellular Centers when compared with the Low Traf-
fic Centers. From a technological point of view and
given election normative, transmitted data behav-
ior should not differ across centers. Further, Mart´ın
finds that there is a statistically significant associ-
ation between the number of votes cast in a center
and the size of the packets that were transmitted
from the center to the CNE servers; this is unex-
pected under the election normative that requires
that centers transmit only a total count to CNE.
These findings promptMart´ın to suggest that CNE
servers, voting machines or both might have been
programmed to process votes in different types of
voting centers differently. Other explanations for the
differential behaviors are possible as well, and in
the absence of information about the association be-
tween transmission volume and type of voting cen-
ter, it is not possible to conclude that tampering
took place. Mart´ın’s contribution, however, is valu-
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able in that it highlights the use of transmission
metadata and proposes approaches to explore those
data. Electronic voting systems are becoming the
norm worldwide, and therefore, forensic methods
that make use of transmission metadata might be-
come the standard hot auditing approach. The lim-
itations of Mart´ın’s approach can serve to inform
future protocols, so that more conclusive (perhaps
even causal) conclusions can be reached in election
auditing.
3.5 Hausmann and Rigobo´n
Hausman and Rigobo´n use the same exit poll data
that were analyzed in the Prado and Sanso´ manu-
script. In addition, they also use the (known) pro-
portion of signatures in favor of holding the refer-
endum, by voting center. Hausmann and Rigobo´n
reason as follows: both the proportion of signatures
in a voting center and the proportion of reported
YES votes collected in the exit poll at the center
are independent and noisy measurements of the vote
intention of voters in the center. Voters in a center
who had earlier signed the petition for a referendum
are expected to have cast a YES vote, but for many
reasons, it is also expected that the number of ac-
tual YES votes in a center will not be identical to
the number of voters who signed the petition. Simi-
larly, if the exit polls are reasonably well conducted,
one would expect that in those centers where the
voters cast a high percentage of YES votes, the sur-
vey numbers would also indicate a large proportion
of YES votes. Because the noise in the two estimates
of intention of vote are due to different factors, it is
also reasonable to think that the errors in the two
measurements will be uncorrelated.
The authors found that the correlation between
the estimated residuals from models where the ob-
served number of YES votes were regressed on ei-
ther the proportion of signatures or on the predicted
proportions of YES in the exit polls were highly
correlated, at least in voting centers where by all
indications, the YES should have defeated the NO
votes. By using a latent variable approach to explain
this apparent correlation, they conclude that the ev-
idence leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of no
electronic fraud. The statistical evidence, coupled
with several other observations, lead these authors
to conclude that voting machines in about 70% of
the voting centers were manipulated to produce of-
ficial counts that did not reflect voters’ intent.
In addition to the analyses described above, Haus-
mann and Rigobo´n also address the issue of selection
of voting centers where a hot audit was conducted
by the government. Each voting machine provided
voters with a paper confirmation of their vote. The
paper ballots were to be put in a sealed ballot box
that could later be used to audit the accuracy of the
tallies by the voting machines. An audit conducted
on the same day in which the voting took place se-
lected what was supposed to be a random sample
of 1% of voting machines. For these, the machine
tallys were to be compared with the paper ballots
in the ballot box. This audit was conducted in a less
than satisfactory way (see the Carter Center report
of 2004). Hausmann and Rigobo´n argue that the se-
lection of voting machines for this audit was far from
random and indeed suggest that the CNE selected
machines only from those centers in which the CNE
knew no electronic fraud had been committed.
The Hausmann and Rigobo´n conclusions that fraud
did indeed occur are somewhat of a stretch given the
evidence. While it is true that the null hypotheses
of no departures from what would be expected if
the election results reflected voters’ intentions is re-
jected, there may be many other explanations for
what was observed. Undoubtedly, the results from
these analyses are persuasive, in particular when
coupled with other facts such as the refusal of the
CNE to share its random number generator for se-
lecting machines to be audited. In a briefing pa-
per published by the Center for Economic and Pol-
icy Research, Weisbrot, Rosnick and Tucker (2004)
state that not only the random number generator
but the source code and other relevant material were
shared by the CNE with a group of international ob-
servers.
3.6 Jime´nez
The manuscript by Jime´nez serves both as a valu-
able contribution to this issue and also as a dis-
cussion of several of the other manuscripts we in-
clude here. Jime´nez uses only the actual votes that
were cast in each voting machine in voting centers
with two or more machines. In the absence of a full
manual count of the paper ballots, Jime´nez proposes
that the most reliable approach consists in testing
a sequence of hypotheses that account for scenarios
where irregularities were present but are explainable
by causes other than deliberate fraud.
Jime´nez proposes to base all inference on the sam-
pling distribution of test statistics which can be de-
rived by permutation of the voting cards of each
voter in each voting center. First, he assumes that
the joint conditional distribution of outcomes per
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voting machine given the total vote count in each
center is a multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
If we observe ν votes in a machine, where y and n
correspond to YES and NO votes, and where ν −
y − n correspond to OUT votes (where OUT de-
notes votes that are not valid for different reasons),
any such vector of size ν can be viewed as a permu-
tation of a vector with the same counts, but where
votes are shuffled across voters in the machine. That
is, if voters are randomly assigned to machines, then
given (ν, y,n) any permutation of vote cards has the
same probability of occurring.
Jime´nez formulates the null hypothesis of a fair
referendum, where the votes per machine correspond
to a random draw from the multivariate hyperge-
ometric distribution indexed by (ν, y,n). A main
point in his discussion is that rejection of the null
hypothesis does not imply that the referendum was
unfair; other alternatives are also possible. He pro-
ceeds by formulating and testing several alternative
hypotheses and finally concludes that indeed, the
departures from the null model that were observed
in the 2004 RR cannot be explained by innocent
mistakes or random chance.
The final conclusion from Jime´nez’s analysis is, as
in the earlier contributions, that the irregularities in
the referendum introduced a bias in favor of the win-
ning position, and that the bias was large enough to
have resulted in the incorrect result with high prob-
ability. Even though Jime´nez agrees at least in part
with the other contributors, he is critical of several
of the approaches that they used to arrive at their
results. One such criticism is that no one made use
of the “full information” that was available from the
official reports. By “full information” Jime´nez refers
to the nonvalid votes and abstentions reported at
the lowest electoral unit level. While his point that
all available information ought to be used in foren-
sic analyses is well taken, it seems that in the case
of the 2004 Venezuelan RR this additional piece of
data did not lead to results that contradicted those
by the other authors in this issue.
4. DISCUSSION
There are many ways in which an election can
be rigged, so that the outcome does not in the end
reflect voters’ intentions. The increasing popular-
ity of electronic voting systems has allowed for the
possibility of subtle tampering that can be diffi-
cult to identify except through a complete audit.
In some instances, even completing an audit can be
a challenge if the electronic voting machines do not
produce a paper confirmation of vote that can be
saved for a manual count if the audit becomes nec-
essary.
There has been quite a lot of discussion in the
recent literature on how to define an election pro-
tocol that can reduce the opportunity for fraud (or
even innocent mistakes) and increase voter confi-
dence in the outcome. An example is the work by
Elklit and Reynolds (2002), who propose an elec-
tion assessment approach consisting of 11 different
steps (see their Table 1). For each step, Elklit and
Reynolds provide performance indicators and also
variables that can be used to determine whether the
performance is adequate. Dopp (2009) focuses on
post-election auditing protocols and presents a com-
prehensive set of procedures to be carried out before
the post-election audit begins, as it progresses and
once it has been completed. Dopp and Elklit and
Reynolds, and indeed much of the political science
literature, emphasize the procedural aspect of elec-
tion assessment and auditing. Stark (2008), in con-
trast, views the issue of designing a post-election au-
dit as a constrained optimization problem and pro-
vides insight on the size of the post-election audit
sample as well as a sequential testing approach that
either confirms the election outcome after a partial
audit or leads to a complete re-count.
The collection of manuscripts included in this Ve-
nezuela issue provides good insight into some of the
statistical tools that may be useful when evaluat-
ing the integrity of an election. While the focus of
most of the work was the 2004 Presidential Recall
Referendum held in Venezuela, the major contribu-
tion of the Venezuela issue is methodological; the
manuscripts in this issue propose creative ways in
which different sources of information arising in an
election can be analyzed and interpreted to assess
the election. None of the election forensic projects
described in this issue can, by themselves, provide
convincing evidence that irregularities observed in
the electoral process are due to deliberate fraud.
Even Jime´nez, who proposes the most sophisticated
(from a statistical viewpoint) methodology, is still
unable to establish that tampering occurred with
certainty. The collection of tools and conclusions,
however, does paint a persuasive picture which sug-
gests that a battery of tests and data sources may be
more effective for election performance assessment
than a single method.
Because it is so critical that the true winner is
called in an election, it would be ideal if we could de-
sign election audit procedures that allow causal in-
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ference. This, however, is not possible and as a con-
sequence election forensics can only suggest associ-
ations. The approach proposed by Mart´ın, however,
can be amenable to a quasi-experimental design if
the properties of the transmissions between voting
machines and central servers are well understood
before the election begins; this would allow decid-
ing if the behavior of transmissions that are carried
out during the election is surprising in some way.
Mart´ın’s work shows, above all, that there are ways
other than traditional vote counting that can shed
some light on the quality of an election.
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